双语畅销书《艾伦图灵传》第9章:退隐山林37

Polanyi attacked the Laplacian picture on the grounds that it induces the teaching that material plaining at the suggestion that all cultural activities should subserve the power of the State in transforming society for the achievement of welfare.他把这些尖锐的意见，与苏联政府联系起来，反对“全力以赴地追求物质丰富”。Alan produced for Polanyi a photograph of a horse-race finish,图灵给波兰尼看了一张赛马的照片，照片中有两匹马正在并肩冲刺，in which of two neck-and-neck horses one could be said to have won if a jet of spittle were counted as part of its body, and not otherwise—a contingency not allowed for in the rules.假如给其中一匹马加装喷气发动机，它就肯定会赢，而另一匹马则肯定会输（不考虑意外情况）。But the thrust of the Christian philosophers arguments lay in a very different direction from his own.而那位基督教哲学家，却有着非常不一样的观点。This was the background to a formal discussion on The Mind and the Computing Machine held in the philosophy department at Manchester on 27 October 1949.就在这样的背景下，1949年10月27日，曼彻斯特哲学系举行了一场正式的关于“思维和计算机”的研讨会。Just about everyone in British academic life with a view to express had been assembled.英国学术界所有的不同观点，差不多都在这里汇集了。It began with Max Newman and Polanyi arguing about the significance of Godels theorem, and ended with Alan discussing brain cells with J.Z. Young, the physiologist of the nervous system.会议一开始，M·纽曼与波兰尼争论哥德尔定理的意义，到快要结束时，图灵与神经学家J·Z·杨探讨了大脑细胞。In between, the discussion raged through every other current argument, the philosopher Dorothy Emmet chairing.在会议中间，话题迅速地覆盖了每一种不同观点，会议的主持人是哲学家多罗西·艾米。The vital difference, she said during a lull, seems to be that a machine is not conscious.在间歇休息时，她说：“最关键的区别在于，机器似乎没有意识。”But such a use of words would satisfy Alan no more than would Polanyis assertion that the function of the mind was unspecifiable by any formal system.这样的说法显然不能说服图灵，还包括波兰尼所说的，任何形式系统都无法刻画思维的作用。He wrote up his own view, which appeared as a paper, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in the philosophical journal Mind in October 1950.图灵把自己的观点写出来，形成了一篇名为《计算机器与智能》的论文，并于1950年10月发表在哲学期刊《心灵》上。